Passerelle - for a secular and democratic Syria¹

The president in image, the emir in practice: Syria in transition.

The Image of power, The power of image

On 7 May, Emmanuel Macron received Ahmed Al-Sharaa—Syria’s newly appointed interim president—at the Élysée Palace, symbolically restoring diplomatic ties severed 13 years ago with Bashar Al-Assad’s regime. For France, this gesture signals a major political pivot. But what lies beneath this seemingly bold overture? More pointedly, who is this « new face » of Syrian power? Until late 2024, Ahmed Al-Sharaa was known as Abu Mohamed Al-Jolani, the former leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a jihadist group designated as a terrorist organisation by the European Union, United States, Canada, and other Western nations. Once a key figure in Syria’s violent insurgency—sent by none other than ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—Al-Jolani now rebrands himself as a statesman: suited, poised, and speaking the language of moderation and reconstruction.

Western media have readily embraced this transformation narrative, suggesting that a change in appearance signals a change in ideology. Al-Sharaa himself claims to have evolved, tailoring his rhetoric to meet the expectations of international diplomacy. But is this newly polished image a reflection of real political change, or merely a strategic camouflage? This rebranding effort has not stopped at Paris. On 14 May 2025, when Al-Sharaa met with former U.S. President Donald Trump during a summit in Saudi Arabia. This historic encounter marked the first meeting between American and Syrian leaders in 25 years. Following the meeting, Trump announced the lifting of all U.S. sanctions on Syria, stating that « they have endured enough disasters » and expressed willingness to normalize relations with Syria’s new government.  

Together, these developments suggest a troubling dynamic: the reintegration of a militant past into mainstream geopolitics, under the guise of a new beginning. As the European Union follows suit with its own promises of aid, it is vital to interrogate the gap between the image being projected and the political realities on the ground.

Words and Deeds – or the state of the “Abus”

The so-called Syrian State under Ahmed Al-Sharaa is, in truth, the state of the “Abus”—a shadow governance dominated by former jihadist figures who now wear suits but have neither renounced their ideology nor relinquished real control. While the president’s image is carefully crafted for the international stage, the reality is one of uninterrupted continuity with the apparatus and logic of HTS. All key ministries—especially the strategic ones—remain firmly in the hands of HTS loyalists. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for instance, is headed by Assaad Al-Shaibani, known by his kunya Abu Aisha, a former jihadist. The Ministry of Defence is openly managed by HTS commanders, including foreign fighters in high-level positions. Even ministries ostensibly led by technocrats are supervised by HTS cadres.

The Ministry of Justice offers a revealing example. Judges within the High Council have been replaced almost entirely by individuals trained in Sharia law, often without formal legal qualifications. The former Justice Minister, Shadi Al-Waissi, retained his post until March 2025—despite public outrage over leaked videos from 2015 showing him ordering the execution of women accused of prostitution. His successor, Mazhar Al-Wais, is cut from the same ideological cloth. A prolific religious judge and poet, Al-Wais once penned a poem titled “For the Love of the Taliban”, glorifying their ideology and governance model. His lectures frequently cite radical thinkers such as Abdullah Azzam and Abu Qatada Al-Falastini, offering little indication of ideological revision or repentance. His transformation, like Al-Sharaa’s, is skin-deep: a trimmed beard and formal attire replacing the uniform of a militant.

This ideological continuity extends to so-called “transitional justice.” On 17 May, Alsharaa issued a decree establishing a Transitional Justice Commission, headed by Abdel Latif—himself a former political bureau member of an armed militia! Tasked with investigating the crimes of the Assad regime, the commission was formed without consultation with independent Syrian human rights organisations, nor does it reference international resolutions on war crimes. Most strikingly, it deliberately excludes any examination of atrocities committed by other actors in the conflict—including HTS, Al-Nusra, and ISIS.

In doing so, the regime instrumentalises justice as a political tool—deploying it selectively to settle scores with rivals while shielding its own past and present crimes. This is not transitional justice. It is ideological amnesty in the guise of legal reform, designed to consolidate power and rewrite history on the regime’s terms. On 25 May, a further scandal erupted: investigative judge Ahmed Haskal was severely beaten by members of the General Security apparatus at Aleppo while on official duty inspecting a crime scene. He was detained for 24 hours, during which he suffered serious injuries, before being released. The assault was not only a direct attack on the judiciary—it occurred in full view of his colleagues and under the watch of a regime that claimed to be rebuilding state institutions.

Two days later, on 27 May, Judge Haskal was forced to drop all charges and formally renounce his legal claim against the assailant, Ubaidah al-Tahan, head of Aleppo’s Salahiyin District. This decision came after intense pressure from al-Tahan’s tribal, combined with direct threats against the judge and his family. Though the case sparked public outrage, legal protests, and even a sit-in by lawyers and judges at the Palace of Justice, the regime’s silence spoke volumes. The forced withdrawal of Judge Haskal underscores the reality of institutional collapse and the dominance of personal networks and militia-backed impunity.

Sectarian Massacres and Targeted Violence

Between 6 and 10 March 2025, a series of massacres on a dramatic scale took place along the Syrian coast, primarily targeting Alawite civilians. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), at least 1,676 people were killed in these attacks, described as sectarian reprisals. The violence against Alawite civilians did not stop after the massacres. Although the intensity of these crimes has decreased, targeted killings continue almost daily. In some cases, they are committed by uncontrolled groups; in others, by factions directly linked to the security institutions. For example, yesterday four Alawite civilians were killed and three others wounded by gunfire following an altercation with armed shepherds from Bedouin tribes. The latter sought to seize “Alawite” farmland and opened fire when the rightful owners came to harvest their crops. This incident, reported by the SOHR illustrates a broader pattern: the disarmament campaigns launched by the authorities since the fall of the regime have focused almost exclusively on Alawite areas, while tribal militias or armed groups close to the government remain untouched.

Furthermore, sectarian violence is not confined to the Alawite community. According to the SOHR, more than 102 people, including Druze fighters and civilians, lost their lives in the suburbs of Damascus and Suweida following a wave of violence sparked by the circulation of a fake audio recording attributed to a Druze sheikh allegedly insulting the Prophet.

The Politics of Image: Substance Without Reform

Ahmed al-Sharaa’s presidency is not the result of institutional transformation but of calculated image management. His public persona has become a disembodied symbol—detached from the actual structures of power, unburdened by ideological consistency or historical accountability, and strategically amplified by a complacent international press. He is presented as a reformist statesman, stripped of the militant “Abous” who still command the State apparatus, with no mention of the family networks he has placed in key posts, and without reference to the religious orthodoxy that continues to underpin the political order. Yet behind the polished exterior lies a regime virtually indistinguishable from the jihadist organisation that has governed parts of northern Syria since 2017. HTS’s institutions remain intact, their ideologues still in power, their judicial framework based on hardline interpretations of Sharia law unchanged. Al-Sharaa’s image may have evolved; power has not.

Conclusion: Aid Must Follow Accountability

If the United States and the European Union are serious about shaping Syria’s future, they must look beyond political optics. Macron’s and Trump’s handshake with Al-Sharaa may serve a symbolic function—but without concrete commitments to human rights and institutional reform, it risks legitimizing a purely cosmetic rebranding of a violent past. Foreign aid and diplomatic recognition should be contingent on measurable progress in justice, inclusion, and demilitarisation. Otherwise, the West may find itself complicit in replacing one authoritarian regime with another.